The consolidated fraud and theft guideline, U.S.S.G. S2B1.I, has been a subject of sustained comment and critique since its adoption in 2001. Some of the critiques are technical and relate to issues such as the importance of "loss" in economic crime sentencing and the proper definition of concepts like "intended loss" and "sophisticated means." However, for the last decade or so, the dominant complaint has been that 2 2Bi.i prescribes sentences that, particularly for many defendants in cases involving high loss amounts, are far too long. ' Therefore, when the Commission several years ago undertook a reexamination of economic crime sentencing, 2 one of the fundamental questions it faced was whether the charge of excessive severity was accurate, and if so, as to all economic criminals or only some. In her January 9, 2°I5, remarks accompanying the release of draft amendments to S 2BI.I, Judge Patti B. Saris, Chair of the Commission, observed that the Commission's study has led us to believe that the fraud guideline may not be fundamentally broken for most forms of fraud.
[Economic crime] sentences on average hew fairly closely to the guidelines for all but the highest dollar values, over $i million in loss. In our discussions with judges and a comprehensive survey several years ago, we learned that, while some judges are concerned about the fraud guideline, most are relatively satisfied with it for most types of fraud. 3 In short, she seemed to say that, although the fraud guideline works fine for "most" cases, it does not work so well for cases with losses over $i million. 4 This carefully modulated conclusion did not go down well among those who, like the ABA and some defense advocacy groups, feel that the guideline is fundamentally flawed, produces unduly high sentences for defendants across the loss spectrum, and needs to be completely rewritten. 5 Even so,
given that eight of the sixteen steps on the loss table concern loss over $i million, that there are more than 1400 cases annually with loss over $i million, and that such cases constitute some 17 percent of the total number of fraud defendants sentenced each year, 6 the conclusion that Accordingly, one would have expected the latest amendments to S 2BI.I to concentrate on the class of highloss offenders the Commission seemed to agree are overpunished by the guidelines. However, the amendments approved in April 20i 7 -though in several cases laudable for other reasons-will have little or no material impact on the guidelines ranges for very high-loss offenders, while producing modest guidelines reductions for some number of low-to-moderate-loss offenders. In short, the Commission's ballyhooed multiyear study of the economic crime guideline seems to have fizzled.
That is unfortunate. While I agree with the Commission's basic conclusion that for many, perhaps most, economic offenders the guidelines do not suggest manifestly unreasonable sentences, 8 I also think that for high-loss defendants the fraud guideline is, in Judge Saris's phrase, "fundamentally broken." The Commission seems to believe that the latest amendments will at least ameliorate the high-loss offender problem. Unfortunately, the guidelines for high-loss offenders are so "fundamentally broken" that these tiny tweaks will have no meaningful effect. Accordingly, the remarks that follow: (a) describe in some detail the historical roots and current causes of the high-end distortion of the fraud guidelines, (b) demonstrate that the 2015 amendments fail to solve or even materially ease the problem, and (c) make some concrete suggestions for bringing the guidelines for high-loss offenders into the sphere of practical utility.
In particular, I recommend that the Commission:
Determine the maximum punishment that ought to be imposed for economic crime in any but the most extraordinary case, and modify S 2Bi.I so it generates sentences scaled downward from that maximum.
I. The Fraud Guideline, High-Loss Defendants, and Factor Creep
The unrealistically high sentences now prescribed by the guidelines for high-loss defendants are the result of four aspects of the evolution of 2B1.I. First, the original fraud and theft guidelines were designed to change the pre-guideline status quo, in which virtually all white collar criminals customarily received probation, to a new state of affairs in which significant white collar criminals were sentenced to prison. The original fraud guideline, U.S.S.G. 5 2FI.I (1987), accomplished this end by employing loss amount as the primary proxy for offense seriousness and calibrating a "loss table" so that defendants who caused modest-to-high losses (a minimum of $20,000 or higher if convicted at trial, or $Ioo,ooo or higher if convicted by plea) would have to spend at least some time in prison. Although the first fraud guideline did mandate prison for many defendants who would not previously have done time, it did not require very much time, even for the worst offenders. The base offense level (BOL) for a fraud conviction was then 6, and the highest loss accounted for by the original table was $5 million. Offenders who stole that much or more were subject to an offense level increase of only ii, producing a total offense level of 17 and a resultant sentencing range for a first-time offender of 24-30 months. Moreover, the original fraud guideline contained only one non-loss sentencing factor, an enhancement of 2 levels for more than minimal planning or multiple victims or a false claim to have acted on behalf of a charity or violation of a judicial order. Thus, the maximum possible offense level for a first-time offender under the original S 2FI.I was 19, which translated to a sentencing range of 30-37 months. 9 Second, after 1987, in response to a variety of stimuli, including the obvious disparity between the low sentences prescribed by the initial guidelines for economic offenders and the much higher sentences prescribed for drug and other offenses, guideline sentences for economic offenses increased steadily through the 199os. These increases were effected in part by modifying the loss table, which in 1989 was expanded to 18 levels and a maximum loss amount of $8o million.' 0 This change alone increased sentences for high-loss defendants because the fact of conviction (BOL 6) plus loss amount could now generate a total offense level of 24 and a sentence range of 51-63 months without resort to any other specific offense characteristics (SOCs). But as time passed, the more important development was a steady accretion of new SOCs that added offense levels on top of the sum of the base offense level and the levels added for loss amount. In 1988, the fraud guideline contained only one aggravating SOC other than loss amount. By 2000, there were sixteen aggravating SOCs other than loss amount, which could plausibly add from 2 to 14 offense levels in any given case." Moreover, many of these enhancements correlated strongly with the occurrence of high-dollar fraud.' 2 Key to understanding the current dysfunction of the fraud guideline for high-loss offenders is recognition that, because of the logarithmic character of the 43-level Sentencing Table, each increase in offense level has an ever-greater absolute  effect on sentence length, the higher one goes up the Table. Adding one offense level to the total of a first-time offender who previously had an offense level of 19 (the original 1987 maximum under 2F1.I) increases his minimum sentence by 3 months and his maximum by 4 months. The same onelevel increase from an offense level of 30 increases the defendant's minimum sentence by ii months and his maximum by 14. And a one-level increase for an offender with an offense level of 36 increases his minimum by 22 months and his maximum by 27. Consequently, as the years passed and the guidelines added more and more SOCs, and thus more and more offense levels to the scores of defendants who by virtue of large loss amounts were already bound for prison, the guideline sentences for such defendants increased disproportionately to those who committed lower-loss crimes.
Third, one must understand how the "Economic Crime Package of 2001" was developed and enacted. The yearslong process that produced the package was driven by two different concerns, and therefore proceeded until the very end on two parallel, largely nonintersecting, tracks. On one track was a group that believed the formerly separate theft and fraud guidelines were duplicative and in many places logically flawed or badly drafted. This group set out to consolidate and rewrite the two guidelines so that they would be easier to apply and would better differentiate between different types and grades of economic offender. On the other track was a group concerned with sentence severity. This second group was divided between one faction that thought the guidelines over-emphasized imprisonment for low-level offenders and a second contingent (including the Justice Department and many judges and probation officers) that felt the economic crime guidelines did not sufficiently punish serious economic criminals. A considerable number of important contributors to the severity debate held both views.
Those concerned with the technical deficiencies in the former theft and fraud guidelines focused on the many theoretical, definitional, and structural issues presented by the consolidation and redrafting project. The new consolidated S 2BI.I went through a near-infinity of drafts that were circulated, commented upon by all the interested parties, redrafted, and even, in the case of the new "loss" definition, field-tested by judges and probation officers at a special meeting convened by the Sentencing Commission for that purpose.' 3 Those worried about severity made some contributions to the technical side of the project, but focused most of their efforts on reconfiguring the loss -and for which, therefore, the large enhancements in the Loss Table are already a proxy-and giving those factors independent, cumulative, logarithmic weight in setting a sentence.
To show the progressive increase in guideline sentences for fraud defendants over the past quarter-century, I attach Tables A-i Several critical facts emerge from this data. First, out of 8,503 fraud defendants sentenced in 2012, only 123 were involved in cases with losses higher than $20 million, and only 14 were sentenced for frauds involving more than $ioo million.
2 9 Put another way, only 123 defendants were sentenced using the top five of the sixteen total steps on the current loss table, and only fourteen were sentenced using the top three. This fact in itself should give rise to serious doubt about the structure of a table that devotes nearly onethird of its 16 levels to parsing the relative severity of the crimes of just over one percent of the defendants to whom it is applied. Second, Commission staff helpfully identified the number of specific offense characteristics other than loss that were found by the court and applied in each FY 2012 defendant's case. Figure 8 in the staff presentation (reproduced below) suggests that relatively few SOCs are applied in most cases, even at the high end of the loss spectrum.
For example, the chart shows that in seven of the eight loss categories of $i million and higher, half or more of the defendants were sentenced with either zero or only one SOC in addition to loss. Some have suggested that this data means that too many SOCs are not really a problem at high loss levels. 30 But considered more carefully, the Figure 8 data cannot support that sanguine conclusion.
To begin, even taken at face value, Figure 8 tells us that one-third to one-half of all defendants with loss amounts exceeding $2.5 million are sentenced with two or more SOCs. More importantly, Figure 8 only counts types of SOCs, not offense level increases imposed as a result of each SOC. For example, an enhancement for more than 250 victims counts as one SOC, while violation of a securities law by an officer of a publicly traded company counts as another. A mere two SOCs doesn't sound so bad.., until you realize that together they add io offense levels (6 for more than 250 victims and 4 for violation of securities law) on top of the Base Offense Level of 7 and however many additional levels were added for loss-which effectively triples the defendant's guideline range. In addition, there is every reason to doubt the validity of the data in Figures 8 and 9. I say this not because I doubt that Commission staff carefully collects and accurately reports the data they receive, but because the data reflect only the SOCs and role enhancements found to exist by the judge and applied in the sentencing calculus. What the staff cannot capture is the effect of the simple fact that virtually all these cases were plea bargained and that, particularly at high loss levels, SOCs and role adjustments are routinely bargained away.
How can we know that the numbers reported by the courts often do not reflect how many SOCs would apply if the facts of a high-loss case were honestly assessed? Common sense. For example, Figure 8 of the staff s presentation indicates that 22.4 percent of the FY 2012 cases with loss over $2o million involved no SOCs-which seems highly improbable without negotiated manipulation of the numbers. Ask yourself how it would be possible to commit a $2o million fraud that did not involve at least one of the following: (a) at least io victims, (b) mass marketing, (c) sophisticated means, (d) identity theft in some form, (e) derivation of more than $i million gross receipts from a financial institution, (f) charitable fraud, (g) bankruptcy fraud, or (h) violation of securities or commodities law by a corporate insider or broker. Such a thing may be possible, but the suggestion that an offense of such exquisite rarity occurred in more than one-fifth of the 67 reported cases with more than $20 million in loss strains credulity to the breaking point. Figure 8 also indicates that over 43 percent of all cases with loss over $20 million involved only one SOC, a figure which is scarcely more believable.
Why might the government be disposed to factorbargain away SOCs in high-loss cases? Recall that any fraud defendant with a loss over, say, $20 million is already facing an offense level of 29 (BOL 7 + 22 levels for loss) and a sentencing range of 87-io8 months (7-9 years) without a single SOC or role adjustment. Addition of 2 levels for sophisticated means or any other enhancement generates a total level 31 and a sentencing range of io8-135 months (9-I years). Add 2 more levels for, say, a mere io victims and the offense level becomes 33 and the sentencing range 135-T68 months (ii1-4 years). Prosecutors rarely press for sentences materially higher than that in a negotiated plea for a white collar defendant, even one with a very big loss. 32 This phenomenon is evident in Figure 6 of the staffs presentation (reproduced below), which shows that the average sentence for the 68 defendants in the >$20 million loss category was exactly io8 months, while the average for the 42 defendants in the >$50 million loss category was even lower, at 9 o months. Therefore, when the parties want a plea agreement that generates a sentencing range a highloss defendant might be disposed to accept and a judge to impose, they must either fact-bargain over loss amount, or factor-bargain away those SOCs and role adjustments that legally apply, but that are not necessary to get the sentence to the agreed level, or enter into to a substantial assistance agreement, or some combination of the three. The available data strongly suggests that factor-bargaining is reasonably common in such cases. In addition, the ubiquity of bargained pleas in big fraud cases suggests that loss amount itself is commonly negotiated. If so, the distribution of sentenced defendants among loss categories reported in the staffs Figures 6 and 8 probably under-reports the number of defendants whose crimes actually caused losses in the highest categories-and thus underestimates the distorting effect of the interaction of high loss with multiple SOCs and role adjustments.
Finally, the staffs Figure 6 shows that, in high-loss cases, judges are refusing to give effect to multiple SOCs and role adjustments even when they are found to exist and are factored into the official guideline calculation. Starting with cases involving a more than $i million loss, the gap between the bottom of the calculated guideline range and the sentence actually imposed grows dramatically with every step to the right to the next higher loss plateau. In short, even though the parties may in many cases be muting the effect of multiple SOCs and role adjustments through plea bargaining, the higher the loss plateau, the less judges are inclined to impose the sentences called for by even artificially depressed guideline levels. Now the Commission might ask, "Why should we care about excess SOCs and role adjustments in high-loss cases if they are being routinely bargained away?" Two reasons: First, the presence of so many surplus aggravating factors gives prosecutors unfair bargaining leverage. It means that, in a high percentage of high-loss cases, the government can say, "If you go to trial, the guideline calculation will generate a sentencing range of 20 to 30 years or more-which at least some judges will take seriously and impose. But if you plead guilty, we can negotiate loss amount and factorbargain away those superfluous SOCs and role adjustments, and bring the range down to a reasonable number of years somewhere in the single or low double digits." The guidelines undoubtedly play a role in all plea negotiations. Properly conceived, that role is to set out for the parties the parameters, upper and lower, of what the Sentencing Commission believes is a reasonable sentence. But if the guidelines routinely call for sentences the Commission does not really believe to be proper in the cases to which they nominally apply, then the guidelines cease to serve as honest advice to the parties and the courts about proper punishment, and become nothing more than a bludgeon for the government.
Second, leaving aside plea bargaining effects, the Sentencing Commission should not endorse rules that, if honestly applied, recommend sentences the Commission does not believe appropriate and that judges will not impose. To wave away concerns with excess SOCs for highloss defendants because they rarely drive actual sentences is a plain dereliction of the Commission's duty. If the Commission truly believes that the sentences called for by an honest application of these guidelines to high-loss offenders would produce just sentences-sentences it recommends and would be willing to impose if it were the judge-that is one thing. But if the Commission is unwilling to change these rules only because they are so obviously inappropriate in most of the cases to which they nominally apply that the system now refuses to enforce them, then leaving the rules alone is to perpetuate a pernicious official fiction-which is no less pernicious merely because its worst impact is felt by only a few hundred defendants each year.
Ill. The Commission's Amendments Do Little to Solve the Problem of Distorted Sentences for High-Loss Defendants
If the Commission is indeed determined to solve the problem of unreasonably high guideline sentences in highloss cases-those identified by Judge Saris as involving loss of more than $i million-the amendments adopted in this cycle do very little to accomplish that end.
Inflation Adjustment. Adjusting the loss table for inflation provides a 2-offense-level sentence reduction for defendants at every level of the loss table who happen to fall in the zone created by adjusting the top of the next lowest category for inflation. An inflation adjustment is eminently reasonable, but the change provides no special benefit to high-loss cases. Indeed, because the loss categories are more closely bunched at the bottom of the table (i.e., the difference between a 2-level and 4-level loss enhancement is only $5,ooo, whereas the difference between a 24-level and 26-level loss enhancement is $50 million), and because there are far more defendants in the lower loss levels, this change will benefit many more low-loss than high-loss defendants.
Victim Adjustments. Beginning in November 2003,
\ 21I(b)(2) contained enhancements of 2, 4, and 6 levels for cases with i, 5o, and 250 victims. The rationale for these enhancements was that a defendant who steals directly from many people has, in general, inflicted harm on more persons than a defendant who steals directly from only one. 33 Thus, it was thought reasonable to include in the guidelines some acknowledgement of that fact. However, the number of victims often correlates with loss amount and should not be overemphasized as a separate factor. The 6-offense-level increase triggered by 250 victims-a situation not uncommon in high-loss cases-nearly doubled the applicable guideline sentence.3 4 Plainly, mere victim number had assumed far too much importance. 3 5 In January 2015, the Commission proposed addressing the undue influence of victim number by reducing the size of the S 2Bi.I(b)(2) victim enhancements from 2, 4, and 6 levels to 1, 2, and 3 levels. I no longer think that a separate adjustment for imposing substantial financial hardship makes good practical sense, particularly if it is a multi-level adjustment scaled (necessarily somewhat arbitrarily) to particular numbers of victims. At a moment when we should be trying to reduce the number of difficult-to-exactly-define aggravators in 2B1., this amendment would add one.
Moreover, the imposition of substantial financial hardship surely correlates to some degree with large loss amount. Consequently, whatever ameliorative effect on high-loss cases the proposed amendment to the victim table of S 2Bi.i(b)(2) [cutting the enhancements for io, 50, and 250 victims from 2, 4, and 6 levels to i, 2, and 3 levels] may have, the new substantial hardship enhancement will take away in at least some cases. In short, the new amendment will serve primarily to add yet another to the proliferating list of SOCs that can boost the sentences of fraud defendants generally, and high-loss defendants in particular. 39 The Commission does not seem to have been entirely persuaded. In its final April 2015 amendments, the Commission melded its proposed substantial hardship amendment with its effort to reduce the effect of mere victim number to produce a new 2 Bi.I(b)(2) that reads as follows:
(Apply the greatest) If the offense-(A) (i) involved io or more victims; or (ii) was committed through mass-marketing; or (iii) resulted in substantial financial hardship to one or more victims, increase by 2 levels;
(B) involved 5e or more victims resulted in substantial financial hardship to five or more victims, increase by 4 levels; or (C) involved ze or more "Icfims resulted in substantial financial hardship to 25 or more victims, increase by 6 levels.
40
The result is a curious hybrid. On the one hand, it retains both an enhancement based on mere victim number (io or more) and the original 2-, 4-, and 6-level tiered structure. On the other hand it eliminates the 4-level and 6-level enhancements based on victim number alone, requiring instead proof of "substantial financial hardship" to multiple victims.
This change may have a very modest net ameliorative effect in the universe of high-loss cases. Defendants will no longer receive 4 or 6 levels merely for large victim numbers. Moreover, victims who have suffered "substantial financial hardship" as defined in new Application Note 4 (F) to 5 2Bi.I are a relatively small subset of victims generally. And even in cases where "substantial financial hardship" occurred, proving it for 5 or 25 victims is likely to prove more troublesome than merely counting 5o or 250 victim heads, and thus the government may routinely forego the effort or bargain away the enhancement.
On the other hand, virtually all high-loss defendants will continue to qualify for at least the 2-level bump for ro or more victims. Some who would formerly have been hit with increases for 5o or 250 victims will get increases of the same size because they caused substantial hardship to a relative few of those victims. And some who stole large amounts from 5 or 25 victims rather than lesser amounts from 5o or 250 victims will actually receive larger enhancements than they did before.
In short, the number of cases to which 4 -level or 6-level 2Bi.i(b)(2) enhancements apply may diminish, but to what extent is anybody's guess.
Sophisticated Means.
In 2015, the Commission amended the sophisticated means enhancement, 5 2Bi.I(b)(Io), to specify that it applies only if the defendant being sentenced engaged in or aided and abetted the sophisticated behavior giving rise to the enhancement, as opposed to the offense as a whole. The change seems unobjectionable. In practice, it may give some relief to defendants with relatively minor roles in complex schemes. But particularly in light of the aiding and abetting provision, it seems unlikely to affect very many cases.
Insufficient Aggregate Effect of Proposed Amendments.
The Commission's proposed amendments will reduce the guideline sentences of some fraud defendants. However, as illustrated by the representative cases in Tables A-i and A-2 below, most of those reductions will go to defendants who caused moderate to moderately high loss. This seems odd given Judge Saris's assertion that the courts and the Commission were satisfied with the operation of 2B for those defendants.
Odder still is the fact that these amendments will surely have no effect at all on most high-loss defendants. Unless a high-loss defendant happens to fall in the inflationadjusted zone of the loss table or be subject to a multiple victim enhancement, his guideline calculation will be untouched. Even for the few defendants who fortuitously get the full benefit of both the main 2015 amendments, the maximum possible reduction would be 6 levels: 2 for falling in the inflation-adjusted loss zone and 4 more if the case involved more than 250 victims, but not at least 5 victims who suffer "substantial financial hardship," thus transforming a 6-level victim boost to a mere 2. For a defendant with a high multimillion dollar loss and multiple potential SOCs and role adjustments, even hitting the 6-level jackpot would scarcely dent his total offense level.
See for example, hypothetical Defendants H, I, and J in Tables A-i and A-2.
The real takeaway from the 2015 tweak of5 2Bi.I is that the Commission seems not to understand, or is at least unwilling to address, the three most salient points about the fraud guideline. First, S 2B1.i does not work in a significant number of high-loss cases. Second, it does not work for such cases (a) because the loss table is bloated, and (b) because the Commission keeps teasing out-and awarding additional offense levels for-more and more culpability factors for which loss is already a proxy. The 2015 amendments do not address the bloat in the loss table. And as to the factor creep problem, while the 2015 amendments decrease the influence of one factor, victim number, they increase the influence of a different one, financial hardship, by an amount that for at least some defendants exactly offsets the victim number decline. Overall, the results will be barely perceptible.
IV. Suggestions for Making High-Loss Guidelines Sentences Realistic and Useful
If the Commission really wants to fix the problem of unrealistic guideline sentences for high-loss defendants, it must address three issues: (i) the failure to set a normative upper limit on punishment for financial crime, (2) the bloated loss table, and (3) the logarithmic sentence increases generated by multiple SOCs and role adjustments. Therefore, I would suggest the following measures.
A. Set a maximum limit on punishment for economic crime
The seminal structural flaw in \ 2BI.I is the failure (a) to set a ceiling on the punishment government can justifiably mete out for the most serious financial crimes, and then (b) to scale the punishments for lesser forms down from that maximum. In virtually every other crime category, the guidelines provide some conception of the worst form of that crime likely to face a sentencing judge and prescribe a rough maximum sentence for that form. For first degree murder, the offense level is 43 (life imprisonment).
'
Treason where "the conduct is tantamount to waging war against the United States" has an offense level of 43.4' The guideline for an attempted murder provides a maximum offense level of 41 (27-33.75 years), even in an aggravated case like an attempted contract killing where the victim sustained permanent injury. 43 Similarly, the robbery guideline, S 2B 3 ., is structured so that even a robbery with virtually every possible aggravator generates an offense level of no more than 41. 44 Even a complex (and quite tough) guideline like S 2D1.I governing drug crimes is sufficiently well-calibrated that even its most serious forms, with all applicable SOCs counted, rarely produce offense levels that equal or exceed 43.
The result of having a ranking system that sets a rationally supportable upper limit on the most severe punishment that should be imposed for the most serious variant of a crime type is that judges can take seriously both the highest sentence and the scale of lower sentences for that crime type. Consider, for example, the robbery guideline, which prescribes an offense level of 41 (27-33.75 years) for an extremely aggravated form of robbery involving a federally insured bank, a shooting causing life-threatening injury, and a huge pecuniary loss. Some judges might think 27 years too much for such an offense. But it is at least within the realm a rational sentencing authority might recommend, and thus judges will seriously consider imposing it. That being so, if application of the robbery guideline to a second defendant produces a lower offense level of 3i (9-11.25 years), the judge will take that offense level seriously, too, both as an indication of what sentence the Commission actually believes should be imposed and as a comparative measure of how much less serious the second offense is than the first.
By contrast, S 2Bi.i sets no meaningful upper limit on the punishment for economic crime. In high-loss cases, the current version of S 2BI.I can quite easily generate offense levels substantially above the 43 required for life imprisonment, 45 which implies that the Commission thinks big financial fraud is normatively far worse than murder, treason, being a trigger-happy bank robber, or running a major drug cartel. This sort of guideline excess breeds two problems. First, virtually no one believes that financial fraud is worse than murder or treason or blood-soaked bank robbery; in consequence, with rare exceptions, judges are unwilling to sentence high-loss fraud defendants to the terms nominally prescribed by the guidelines. Indeed, in those cases that score worst by the metrics adopted in S 2B1.i, the guidelines do not actually prescribe a sentence. An offense level over 43 is not associated with a recommended term of imprisonment; it is merely a really big number-a sort of numerical epithet-that provides the sentencing judge with no practical guidance.
Second, and even more importantly as a matter of guideline design, because S 2B1.I so easily generates offense levels near or above the top of the sentencing table, judges have no useful yardstick for determining the relative severity of cases with lower offense levels.
For example, suppose one high-loss defendant has a calculated offense level of 44. Suppose further that the sentencing judge, like most of her colleagues, does not view that number as a serious indication the Commission intends imposition of a sentence of 30 or more years, so she imposes a sentence of 2o years. Then suppose that, in the next case, the same judge encounters a fraud defendant with a calculated offense level of 38. Should the judge assume that the Commission does mean what it says in fraud cases with offense levels below 43 and impose the 235-month (roughly 2o-year) sentence called for by the low end of the level 38 sentencing range? If so, that would treat the level 38 defendant virtually identically to the level 44 defendant. Or should she try to achieve some proportionality between the sentences of the level 38 and level 44 defendants? If she decides to do the latter, given that subtracting 6 offense levels roughly halves the applicable guideline minimum sentence, should the judge impose a sentence of io years on the level 38 defendant (one-half the 2o-year sentence she imposed on the level 44 defendant)? And if she does that, what should she do when she encounters a defendant with an offense level of 32, for whom the guideline minimum would be 121 months, or just over io years? In short, given that the sentences nominally prescribed for some undefined subset of high-loss cases are universally understood to be fictional, judges cannot now determine the point on the severity scale where the Commission really means what it says. Accordingly, the Commission should determine the maximum punishment that should be imposed for financial crime absent the most extraordinary circumstancesand then reverse-engineer S 2B1.i from that number downward. The Commission should not try to write into the guideline factors that might justify an extraordinary sentence above this maximum. Identifying extraordinary cases can properly be left to sentencing judges in the exercise of their power to either depart from or vary above the prescribed range.
B. Give the loss table a haircut
Even if the Commission is unprepared to reverse-engineer S 2Bi.I in toto, it could take a number of simple steps that would materially reduce the likelihood of transparently silly, way-more-than-life-sentence guideline calculations in high-loss cases. The first of these steps would be to eliminate the top 4 levels of the loss table (those for loss exceeding $5o million, $ioo million, $200 million, and $400 million). In FY 2012, only 56 of the more than 7,000 defendants sentenced under 2BI.I (or roughly 0.7 percent) fell into these categories. Dividing those few dozen defendants into four groups separated only by arbitrarily chosen loss amounts does not advance the cause of rational sentencing.
However, cutting some or all of the 4 top loss levels would give some room for SOCs and role adjustments to function meaningfully in high-loss cases. Cutting the top 4 would mean that loss amount alone would generate a maximum 22-level enhancement. When added to the base offense level for fraud, this would produce an offense level of 29, and a guideline range of 87-io8 months (7.25-9 years) for a first-time offender with no other SOCs or role adjustments.
If [T]here was an interesting proposal in Mr. Bowman's submission, which I think the Commission should consider, about collapsing the top four levels in the loss table and looking at whether or not you should end it at everything over $20 million, that is-is 22 levels, and that that's your cap. 4 6 It is something of a mystery that, even with Justice Department support, the Commission felt unable to amend the table this year. Perhaps the next amendment cycle will see progress.
C. Reduce the number, size, and cumulative impact of specific offense characteristics in § 2B1.1 Even if the Commission were to eliminate the 4 top loss levels, the number, magnitude, and potential cumulative effect of the SOCs now in 5 2BI.I is so large that honest application of those SOCs to the facts of high-loss cases would continue to produce unrealistically high guideline ranges.
Consider, for example, hypothetical Defendant I in Tables A-i If one is convinced of the need to reduce the number and effect of S 2Bi.i SOCs, a variety of approaches could help achieve that end. Here are a few suggestions:
i. Cap the cumulative effect of SOCs. The simplest solution to the proliferating SOC problem would be to impose a cap on the cumulative effect of all SOCs other than loss. If such a cap were enacted, the court would be obliged to determine the loss and all applicable SOCs, but the total offense level could never be more than the sum of the Base Offense Level, plus the offense level increase corresponding to loss amount, plus the applicable number of SOC adjustments, up to, but not exceeding, the cap. The cap could be set at any number the Commission liked, but I would suggest that careful consideration of two factors should determine the result.
First, setting an SOC cap would accomplish the objective suggested above of setting the maximum sentence the Commission will sanction for economic crime, absent the extraordinary circumstances that would justify an upward departure or variance. Therefore, the cap should be set after careful consideration of what that maximum should be. In my own view, the maximum ought not exceed something like 20-25 years. But under no circumstances should any combination of guidelines factors generate an offense level above the top of the Sentencing Table. Second, loss was chosen as a primary determinant of sentence length in economic crime cases because it is, standing alone, a good general proxy for offense seriousness. Factors in addition to loss, particularly if they are of a type that correlates with loss, should not dramatically overshadow the effect of loss itself. Therefore, I would suggest that the cap be, at the very most, io levels because an increase of ro levels triples the sentence from which one began. 48 It hardly makes sense to allow other factors to have more than triple the effect of the primary measure of offense seriousness. Eight levels, which increases a sentence about 2.5 times, or 6 levels, which roughly doubles a sentence, would be better. The combination of eliminating the top 4 loss levels and capping the effect of non-loss SOCs would have the additional benefit of leaving some room for role adjustments under Chapter 3 to have a meaningful effect on the final offense level calculation even in big cases. By way of illustration, consider hypothetical Defendant J in Tables A-i 
aggravating role and abuse of trust. In other words, the combination of base offense level, loss amount, and \ 2B1.I SOCs pushes his offense level so high that the Chapter 3 role adjustments are functionally meaningless. However, if, as suggested above, the loss enhancement were capped at 22 levels for more than $20 million, and the SOC adjustments were capped at ten (or fewer), Defendant J's offense level considering S 2BI factors only would be 39 (at most). Accordingly, there would still be room on the Sentencing Table for Chapter 3 role adjustments to count.
2.
Reduce the number of levels assigned to many SOCs. Virtually all of the offense level increases associated with S 2B1.i SOCs are expressed in increments of two. For example, the multiple victim adjustments of S 2B1.i(b)(2) are for 2, 4, and 6 levels, employing sophisticated means triggers a 2-level adjustment, and securities law violations by a broker or dealer trigger a 4-level adjustment. Given that every 2-offense-level increase raises a defendant's sentencing range by 25 percent, it seems doubtful that all of these SOCs really merit sentence increases of the magnitude they trigger.
In January 2015, the Commission proposed amending the multivictim enhancement of S 2B1(b) (2) by reducing the increments from 2, 4, and 6 levels to 1, 2, and 3 levels. Even if the Commission is not disposed to halve the value of some S 2B SOCs for all defendants, it should consider that the 25 percent sentence increase resulting from a 2-level SOC translates into much more additional prison time when applied to a defendant at the top of the Sentencing Table than to one at the bottom. Therefore, it might make sense to reduce the offense-level value of SOCs for cases involving loss over a specified amount. For example, the 4-level enhancement for violation of securities law by a dealer or broker might remain for cases with loss less than, say, $i million, but be reduced to 3 levels if the loss was more than $i million, and 2 levels if the loss was greater than $20 million. The dual objectives of such graduated enhancements would be to make the sentencing effect of a given SOC somewhat more constant for all offenders and to prevent multiple SOCs from inflating the guideline ranges of high-loss offenders into the zone of unreality.
3.
Eliminate the sophisticated means enhancement. The theoretical function of the sophisticated means enhancement is to give numerical expression to the idea that frauds involving large amounts of planning activity and high levels of specialized expertise are more blameworthy and socially dangerous than frauds of a simpler sort. While the theory is sound enough, 50 putting it into practice has proven consistently frustrating. If loss is moderately large, courts virtually always find sophisticated means in any but the very simplest schemes, and often even in those. A final possibility for the sophisticated means enhancement would be to eliminate it as a specific offense characteristic that adds offense levels and transform it into a factor judges would be encouraged to consider when determining the position of a sentence within the advisory sentencing range. In other words, the guideline would say that, if sophisticated means were used, the judge should consider it as a factor in setting a sentence above the minimum of the advisory range.
V. Conclusion
The Sentencing Commission's multiyear study of the fraud guideline has so far produced a damp squib. Perhaps more time for thought and the confirmation of two new commissioners will produce fireworks next year. At all events, I hope the foregoing analysis and suggestions provide a bit of ammunition for those who would like more percussive change. Judge Saris echoed the same basic sentiment in the press release accompanying the April release of the 2015 amendments: "We found through comprehensive examination that the fraud guideline provides an anchoring effect in the vast majority of cases, but there were some problem areas, particularly at the high-end of the loss 
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For example, in a fraud case with a loss of greater than $2.5 million, the base offense level would be 7, with an additional 18 levels added for loss, totaling 25, which carries a sentencing range of 57-71 months. Adding 10 levels would produce a final offense level of 35, which carries a sentencing range of 168-210 months.
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For better or worse, I probably bear some responsibility for the existence of the § 2B1. Assumes fraud conviction (Base Offense Level 7), increase of 20 levels for loss of more than $9.5 million but less than $30 million (using the new inflation-adjusted loss table), 2-level sophisticated means, 4-level violation of securities law by officer of publicly traded corporation, 3-level health care fraud greater than $7 million, 4-level aggravating role, 2-level abuse of trust. Table A -2 assumes first-time offenders (Criminal History Category I) convicted after trial. Sentences for defendants pleading guilty would be slightly lower due to the acceptance of responsibility reduction. Sentences for defendants with criminal records would be slightly (in some cases considerably) higher. Shaded boxes indicate a sentence increase due to guideline change. 
